IRSN provides support – through its Defense-Related Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Nuclear & Chemical Non-Proliferation Division – to the authorities (namely the DSND [representing the office of nuclear safety for defense-related facilities and activities], and the HFDS [senior official for defense and security] of the Ministry of Energy Transition) responsible for defining and implementing defense and security policies, in particular the safety of nuclear facilities and civilian transport.
In this context, the Institute’s experts are called on to fulfill a number of missions such as examining the safety files of defense-related nuclear facilities, analyzing safety and security studies relating to nuclear materials, facilities and transport, and providing support for inspections carried out under France’s international commitments in the field of nuclear and chemical non-proliferation. The Institute also supports the authorities by contributing to the revision of regulatory texts governing nuclear security, and the non-proliferation of nuclear materials.
2022 saw the continuation of the review of safety files relating to the new generation of Barracuda nuclear attack submarines, and in particular the Duguay-Trouin, and assessments of the security studies carried out by the CEA for its main civil nuclear sites, as well as IRSN’s participation in various national nuclear security exercises. Internationally, the Institute provided support for the UK Office for Nuclear Regulation in the assessment of the UK nuclear materials control system.
As part of the support it provides to the authorities, IRSN participated in the review of regulatory texts in 2022 in various fields related to nuclear security and the non-proliferation of nuclear materials.
With regard, firstly, to the protection and control of nuclear materials, facilities and transport, the Institute has contributed, within the working parties set up by the Ministries for, respectively, Energy Transition and the Armed Forces, to the drafting of the implementing orders for Decree No. 2021-713. These orders include in particular the authorization procedure and demonstration of security, physical protection, physical monitoring and accounting of nuclear materials, nuclear security management and information system security. Transitional measures provide for the phased application of this legislation by 2027.
IRSN also participated, as technical support for the Euratom Technical Committee (CTE), in the negotiations to review the introduction of subsidiary arrangements to the French safeguards agreement, conducted with the European Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These could ultimately lead to changes in the list of facilities eligible for Agency inspections and to a review of the formats for transmitting information to the Agency.
As part of the implementation of the Euratom-Third Countries agreements, IRSN has analyzed, on behalf of the CTE, the updated “Guidelines for the application of the Euratom-Third Countries agreements; 2022 revision”, a document intended to guide operators and the authorities of the Member States in the application of these agreements, in particular with regard to the actions required for transfers and inventories of nuclear items.
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TECHNICAL OPINIONS AND REPORTS TO THE EURATOM TECHNICAL COMMITTEE (CTE)
AND HFDS OF THE FRENCH MINISTRY OF ENERGY TRANSITION
As part of the Barracuda program to renew the six nuclear attack submarines of the French Navy, and after the Suffren entered service in summer 2022, trials of the Duguay-Trouin continued with the loading and divergence of the reactor on 30 September 2022. As part of its technical support brief for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Authority (ASND), IRSN examined the safety files relating to these stages. The Institute will continue its assessment work in 2023 during the Duguay-Trouin sea trials phase.
IRSN was contacted by the Office of the senior official for defense and security (SHFDS) of the Ministry of Energy Transition to carry out an expertise of the security studies (protection and control of nuclear materials and associated activities to counter malicious acts and misappropriation) of the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) for its main nuclear sites. After finalizing in 2021 the assessment of studies concerning the CEA center in Fontenay-aux-Roses (Hauts-de-Seine) and transmitting its conclusions to the SHFDS, the Institute was entrusted by the SHFDS in 2022 with conducting a study assessment for the CEA sites in Saclay (Essonne), Marcoule (Gard) and Cadarache (Bouches-du-Rhône). For each of the sites, a notice and an assessment report were written up and sent to the SHFDS, most recently in September 2022.
During the assessment phase, IRSN discusses technical matters with the operator. This malicious acts study assessment requires in-depth knowledge of the configuration of the sites and their protective measures in order to assess their vulnerability to malicious acts.
Since its exit from the European Union in 2020, the United Kingdom has no longer been able to turn to the European Commission for the implementation of its nuclear safeguards obligations vis-à-vis the IAEA and the countries with which it has nuclear cooperation agreements. In this context, at the beginning of 2022, the competent British authority called for a “peer review” of the new organization of the British national nuclear safeguards system, with two representatives of the Euratom Technical Committee and one from IRSN. “The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) approached us to assess the safeguards system put in place by the competent UK authorities for the control of nuclear materials,” says Romuald Bon Nguyen from the Non-Proliferation and Accounting Department. “In order to carry out this peer review, we held discussions with ONR representatives and with manufacturers concerned by nuclear materials regulations, in particular during two missions conducted in the United Kingdom, one in May and the other in July. We also participated as observers in an ONR inspection, which gave us an overview of the methods in place.”
The report drawn up as a result of this assessment highlights the UK’s good nuclear safeguard practices and highlights the maturity of the system in place with regard to its international obligations. Furthermore, the report proposes avenues of reflection for the ONR and, more broadly, for the competent UK authorities.
